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     1 Honorable Milton I. Shadur, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
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VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge
Because we write only for the parties, we need not restate the facts of this case. 
Before this Court, Appellant union articulates only two injuries for which it seeks redress:
(1) the union’s overall goals and mission of promoting the welfare and morale of its
members have been frustrated by the OMB Circular alleged to contain an illegal, overly-
inclusive definition of “inherently governmental work,” and (2) the union has been forced
to expend additional resources to respond to the OMB Circular.
The District Court concluded that the union and its members had not demonstrated
injury-in-fact and therefore granted the Government’s motion to dismiss.  We now affirm
3the decision of the District Court.
Article III’s cases and controversies requirement demands that all litigants in
federal court demonstrate that they have suffered a concrete, legally cognizable injury-in-
fact that is either actual or imminent.  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.  It is incumbent on the
party invoking federal jurisdiction to establish this and every other prerequisite for
standing.  FW/PBS Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990).
In this case, the union has failed to allege an injury-in-fact sufficient to defeat the
Government’s motion to dismiss.  As to the union’s first alleged injury, frustration of its
organizational goals, we conclude that any damage that has occurred to the union
members’ morale and welfare is not a legally cognizable interest.  The union has pointed
to no cases in which a federal employee’s concern that his job may be improperly
outsourced has been recognized as a legally cognizable interest, nor can we find one. 
Instead, the union merely points to Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363
(1982), for support.  In Havens, the Supreme Court concluded that a fair housing
organization had suffered injury to its organizational goals sufficient to confer Article III
standing when two minority testers were discriminated against by a particular housing
unit.  In that case, the plaintiff organization was able to point to a right to equal access to
housing information for minorities, a legally protected interest guaranteed by the Fair
Housing Act that was infringed upon by the housing unit’s racial discrimination.  Here by
contrast, the union can point to no constitutional, statutory or common law ground in
4which a federal employee’s right to peace of mind against potential improper outsourcing
is enshrined.  As such, the union’s first alleged interest is not legally cognizable.
 The union’s second alleged injury fares little better.  Regardless of whether or not
the union has or will continue to expend funds in response to what it perceives as an
unlawful definition in the OMB Circular, the fact remains that the union cannot point to a
single job that has been improperly outsourced.  As such, its preemptive action, while
perhaps prudent, cannot be the basis for injury sufficient to satisfy Article III.  To hold
otherwise would allow the union to manufacture its injury-in-fact, cf. Fair Hous. Council
of Suburban Phila. v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71, 79 (3d Cir. 1998), and
effectively eviscerate the Article III bar.  Until such time as wrongful job loss is either
actual or imminent, any amount of resources diverted by the union to prepare for this
“someday occurrence” is not sufficient injury to confer standing.
Because the union has not alleged a legally cognizable injury-in-fact that is either
actual or imminent, we affirm the decision of the District Court.   
